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ABSTRACT: The objective of this paper is to propose a method that will generate a causal explanation of 
observed events in an uncertain world and then make decisions based on that explanation. Feedback can cause 
the explanation and decisions to be modified. I call the method Theory-Based Inductive Learning (T-BIL). T-BIL 
integrates deductive learning, based on a technique called Explanation-Based Generalization (EBG) from the field 
o_f machine learning, with inductive learning methods from Bayesian decision theory. T-BIL takes as inputs ( 1) a 
decision problem inYOIYing a sequence of related deczsions over time, (2) a training example of a solution to the 
decision problem in one period, and (35 the domain theory relevant to the decision problem. T-BIL uses these 
inputs to construct a probabilistic explanation of why the training example is an instance of a solution to one stage 
of the sequential decision problem. This explanation is then generalized to cover a more general class of 
instances and is used as the basis for making the next-stage decisions. As the outcomes of each decision are 
observed, the explanation is revised, which in turn affects the subsequent decisions. A detailed example is 
presented that uses T-BIL to solve a very general stochastic adaptive control problem for an autonomous mobile 
robot. 
0. Introduction 
Suppose that a decision is to be made when the state of 
the world is uncertain but further information about it 
can be obtained by measurement or experimentation. It 
is given that the decision must be logically consistent 
with the decision maker's own preferences for con­
sequences, as expressed by numencal utilities, and with 
the weights he attaches to the possible states of the 
world, as expressed by probabilities. This is the clas­
sical P!_Oblem of decisiOn analysis (Raiffa and Schlaifer 
1961; Savage 1954). 
If an analyst is asked why he believes a decision to be 
correct or why the observed outcome occurred, he can 
offer an explanation that relates theories, facts, and the 
context. Although explanation facilities have long 
been considered as cential to the construction of expert 
systems in AI, it is only recently that attempts liave 
been made to inte� the explanation facility with the 
basic theory-driven inductive approach of decision 
analysis (LaDglotz et al. 1986). 
In machine learning, the term explanation has been 
given a precise meaning in the context of 
explanation-based generalization (EBG), a technique 
used to generate an explanation of a concept after ob­
serving a single training example (Mitchell et al. 1986). 
An explanation in EBG is a proof, based on prior 
knowledge, that an observed event is a deductive im­
plication of a set of propositions. The explanation is 
generalized to cover not only the observed mstance but 
a more general class of instances. 
An explanation in EBG serves quite a different p�se 
than an explanation produced by an explanation facility 
in an expert system. In an expert system, an explana­
tion is used to show the user the reasoning process 
behind a conclusion. The explanation has been entered 
by a programmer into the expert system and is not used 
by the system's inference procedures. In EBG, the 
explanation has not been written into the system by a 
programmer but is generated by the system's own in­
ference procedures. If a subsequent activity requires 
using kilowledge contained in the explanation, the 
system's inference procedures will have access to and 
can manipulate the explanation. It is as if the program 
can explain to itself what it has learned. 
Learning programs in AI have not, as a rule, been able 
to deal gracefully with noisy data, and EBG is no ex­
ception. The problem that these programs have in 
dealing with stochastic influences probably is related to 
the ongins of the approach in a tradit10n that em­
phasizes the use of deductive logic. EBG can trace its 
roots to the goal regression techniques developed for 
the STRIPS robot problem-solving system by Fikes et 
al.(1972). From tfiose beginnings to the present day, 
learning pro�s from the AI tradition have tended to 
limit therr domain to non-stochastic learning and have 
put the emphasis on symbolic computation. 
Learning that takes place in a stochastic environment 
has been studied most often in fields that are outside of 
the mainstream of AI work. The historical roots are 
different from those of AI, the journals are different, 
and the practitioners are often in other academic 
deparunents. Stochastic learning is central to much of 
the work done in pattern recognition, stochastic adap­
tive control theory, dynamic progx:amming, Bayesian 
decision theory, and statistical inference. The em­
phasis in these areas is on quantitative methods as op­
posed to symbolic computatton. 
In this paper symbolic methods will be integrated with 
�uantitative methods to develop a procedure that can 
1) generate a causal explanation of observed events, 
2) make decisions based on that explanation, and (3) 
use feedback to revise the explanation and decisions. 
This requires solving two problems which I call the 
explanation problem and the decision problem. The 
explanation problem requires the generation and revi­
sion of a probabilistic causal explanation relating the 
state of the world to uncertain outcomes that are the 
consequences of actions initiated by the decision 
maker. The decision problem r�uires using the ex­
planation to make a logical choice amon� alternative courses of action in the decision maker s uncertain 
world. 
1. A Brief Review of Explanation-Based 
Generalization (EBG) 
As presented by Mitchell, Keller, and Kedar-Cabelli 
*Currently oo leave from Universite Laval, �panrnent d'inforrnatique, Quebec, Canada. I would like to thank Paul Black, Oren Etzioni, 
Max Henrion, Steve Minton, Tom Mitchell, and Prassad Tadepalli for their many helpful comments. 
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(1986), EBG is a technique �or learning bY. general�!Jlg 
explanations. The system 1S shown a smgle trammg 
example of an event. It first constructs a specific ex­
planation for the event, and then it generalizes this ex­
planation so that it covers a class of similar events. 
The EBG method requires the following information: 
(1) Goal Concept: A concept definition describing the 
concept to be learned. An example used by Mitchell et 
al. (1986) of a goal concept is Safe-to-Stack{x,y). The 
goal was to determine for a pair of objects <x,y> if it is 
safe to stack x on top of y. The objects were a box and 
a table, and the initial definition used the predicate, 
weight(x). It was assumed that there was no direct way 
to measure the weight of the box, but that its densicy 
and volume could tie measured. The fmal generalized 
explanation therefore used the terms volume(x) and 
density(x) along with the relationship between volume, 
density, and weight 
(2) Training Example: A s�ific example of the con­
cept in terms of observable features. Ail instance of a 
training example for the goal Safe-to-Stack(x,y) would 
be that a box with given density and volume can be 
safely stacked on a table with given weight and stur­
dyness. 
(3) Domain Theory: A set of rules and facts sufficient 
to prove that the training example is an example of the 
goal concept. 
(4) Operationality Criterion: A requirement that the 
imal generalized concept definition be described in 
terms of the predicates used to describe the training 
example or m terms of a selected set of easily 
evaluated predicates from the domain theory. It.is as­
sumed that the initial definition includes at least one 
unobservable term, thus failing to satisfy the 
Operationality Criterion. 
Given this information, an EBG system will construct a 
specific explanation of why the training example 
satisfies the goal concept The specific explanation JS a 
lo�ical proof that demonstrates that the event is en­
tailed by prior information in the form of Horn clauses 
in the knowledge base. The proof is generalized by 
J>ropagating constraints on the variable bmdings among 
ihe various proof rules, but dropping any constraints 
introduced by the �illc example. The EBG tech­
nique for generalizing uses a form of goal regression 
that has been shown to be equivalent to an augmented 
version of resolution theorem proving for Hom Clause 
Logic (fikes et al. 1972; Waldinger 1977; Nilsson 
1980; Mitchell et al. 1986; Mooney and Bennet 1986; 
Kedar-Cabelli and McCarty 1987). 
When EBG has constructed the valid generalization 
from the training example, the system is said to have 
learned the goal concept The kind of learning done by 
using EBG can be characterized as bemg truth 
preserving and nonampliative. By truth preserving I 
mean that there is no possibility that a conclusion about 
an event will be false. By nonampliative I mean that 
nothing is learned that was not previously, at least im­
plicitly, known to the system. In EBG, smce all events 
that could possibly be observed can be explained by the 
available domain theory and all explanations use valid 
forms of deductive logic, the explanation is only an 
explicit formulation of knowledge that was already im­
plicitly available. Any learning that has taken place is 
similar to learning that occurs when one completes a 
mathematical proof of a theorem. 
In contrast to the learning done by EBG, inductive 
learning is not truth preserving but it is ampliative. 
The generalizations and predicuons that are based on 
inductive inferences can be wrong, which is the price 
we pay in order to learn something new about the 
world. 
Since all the knowledge to generate the final goal con­
cept is available in the knowledge base, wh� JS a train­
ing example used? Why not just let ihe system 
generate the proof tree of the final goal concept from 
the initial defmition and the domain knowledge? The 
standard reply has been that the use of a teaming ex­
ample and generalization procedure makes the search 
more efficient There is, however, another reason that I 
would like to l>ropose as being significant The training 
example provides a contextual constraint so that the 
gener3lized proof structure is also a meaningful and 
relevant explanation of the goal concept. 
If EBG is to be used when there is a great deal of 
domain knowledge, it is likely that there will be more 
than one valid proof structure that entails the goal con­
cept. For example, the goal concept Safe-to-Stack(x,y) 
could include clauses stating that x is not made of glass 
and has a flat bottom surface while y has a flat toP. 
surface and is level. If our objective is to determine if 
x can be stacked on y without crushing y, and if x and 
y will always be caidboard boxes of sunilar size but 
different weights in the problem context, then although 
the facts and theory concerning flat surfaces and glass 
containers could be part of a valid proof structure, they 
are irrelevant to the desired goal concept. EBG will 
omit them from the explanations it generates. 
The problem of finding the appropriate explanation 
clearly involves more than merely finding a valid rela­
tion between theory and face It depends on a three­
term relation between theory, fact, and context (van 
Fraassen 1980). An explanation can be considered to 
be the answer to a why-question about the occurrence 
of a certain event. Why JS it safe to stack object x on 
object y? A satisfactory answer depends on the context 
in which the question was asked. EBG solves the 
problem of determining context by requiring a training 
example to be presented to the system and by using a 
generalization technique that follows the SJ>ecific proof 
actually used in the exJ>lanation of the training example 
(DeJong and Mooney 1986). It igt1ores the other pos­
sible ways to complete a proof. The use of a single 
training example to determine context is one of the 
major benefits that EBG brings to theory-based induc­
tive inference. 
We have seen that EBG can generalize and determine 
context on the basis of a single training example. Its 
efficiency at generalization has been bought at the cost 
of requiring substantial domain knowledge about the 
world. There . appears, however, to be another as­
sociated cost The capacity to do inductive inference 
has seemingly been eliminated. This has led resear­
chers to the opinion that an important next step in the 
machine-learnmg research program is to try to integrate 
empirically-based inducuve methods with EBG 
(Mitchell et al. 1986; Lebowitz 1986). The remainder 
of this paper will propose how this might be done. 
2. Combining Probabilistic Reasoning, Utilities, 
and EBG 
EBG has several important limitations that must be 
relaxed before it can be applied to generate and modify 
explanations used in T-BlL. First, EBG builds ex-
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planations using purely deductive, non-probabilistic 
logic. We need to allow probabilistic and statistical 
reasoning to enter into its explanations. Second, al­
though EBG constructs explanations and learns con­
cepts, the concept is learned in a vacuum. I am inter­
ested in concepts that are learned because they will 
have a certain utility for a future decision. The goal 
concept must therefore be linked to a decision with 
observable and measurable consequences. Third, in 
EBG no method has been proposed for revising an ex­
planation on the basis of new information. A method 
for incremental updating of the existing explanation is 
needed. Fourth, EBG cannot represent disJuncts in its 
explanations. A technique for including disjunctive 
propositions will be introduced. 
Probabilistic reasoning will be integrated with EBG by 
associating probablities with every proposition in the 
explanation. Propositions will be referred to as 
hypotheses if the probability of their being true is less 
than one. Definitions will have probability one that 
they are true. Probabilities are to be interpreted as 
quantitative measures of belief in the truth of a 
hypothesis. Prior probabilities are conditional on the 
context and background conditions which are only 
made explicit to a partial degree in an explanation. 
Where possible, probabilities will be given a objective 
interpretation; otherwise they are subJective 
probabilities. Incremental updating will be done by 
applying Bayes' theorem. 
The combination of probabilistic reasoning, utilities, 
and EBG to do theory-based inductive learnmg should 
be referred to by a unique name in order to maintain 
the distinctions between it and the other methods for 
doing inductive inference, learning, and decision 
analysis. I will call the methOd Theory-Based 
Inductive Learning, and will refer to it simply as T­
BIL. 
T-BIL requires information that is substantially dif­
ferent than EBG in order to solve problems and 
generate explanations. Instead of proviiling an initial 
definition of a goal concept, T-BIL requires an initial 
statement of a ilecision problem. In its most general 
form, the decision problem requires sequential deci­
sions to be made wnen the state of the world, and thus 
the outcome of any decision, is uncertain. Moreover, it 
is assumed that additional information can be obtained 
at a cost, either by performing an experiment or by 
some other means. Both EBG and T-BIL require a 
domain theory. There is no essential difference in the 
way this term is used in EBG and T-BIL. 
T-BIL uses a training example, as does EBG, as the 
basis for its generalization procedure. In EBG we can 
consider the mitial goal concept to provide the bound­
ary conditions for tfie most general version of the con­
cept and the training example to provide the boundary 
conditions for the most specific version of the concept. 
Goal regression constructs the bridge between those 
two boundaries, finding the right mix of specialization 
and generalization. In T-BIL, goal regression will ac­
complish the same task, speciiilizing from the initial 
statement of the decision problem and generalizing 
from the training example to find the right level of 
explanation that links the two. This is the major con­
tribution that symbolic methods from machine learning 
make to T-BIL. 
The contributions that quantitative methods make to 
T-BIL are associated with the use of Bayesian decision 
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theory. The decision maker using T-BIL observes the 
outcome of his initial decisions and uses this infor­
mation to update beliefs and revise decisions. Instead 
of referring to these additional observations as training 
examples, I will call them observation reports. The 
distinction is maintained, therefore, between the train­
ing example, which is used with goal regression to 
generate an explanation, and observation reports, 
which are used with Bayesian updating to modify the 
explanation. 
In EBG the operationality criterion is a restriction that 
forces the generalization to use terms that were used in 
the training exam,Ple. In T -BIL, I would like to use a 
concept of operatJ.onalism similar to that first proposed 
by the Nobe1 physicist P.W. Bridgman (1927). The 
idea as adopted by many scientists is that the terms in a 
theory be reducible to operations, usually involving ob­
servation and measurement, that can be publicly 
repeated. There must also be a high degree of agree­
ment among the observers as to the outcome of the 
operation. In essence, theoretical explanations have 
meaning only through their connection with the observ­
able. Since this is different from the operationality 
criterion of EBG, I have called the requirement an 
operational explanation. 
Before discussing how to combine decision anal}'sis 
with EBG, let us look more closely at the decision 
problem. The general decision problem that interests 
us is dynamic and stochastic: It involves decisions 
over time that transform one uncertain state into 
another. The decision maker chooses acts so as to 
maximize the sum of the expected utilities over time. 
It is assumed that the time involved is not long enough 
to require using discounted present values. The chosen 
sequence of decisions is called a policy or a plan. A 
plan that permits the decision maker to maximize the 
sum of the expected utilities is called an optimal plan. 
This description of the decision problem casts it as a 
problem in stochastic adaptive control theory (Bellman 
1961; Dreyfus and Law 1977). 
More formally, the decision problem of finding the op­
timal plan can be described as a dynamic max101ization 
problem 
N 
max 'LEUi(Xi,Di) s.t Xi+l = T;(X;.D;) 
.1=0 
where the variables and relevant features of the deci­
sion problem are defmed as follows: 
(i) Di: Decision set at time i. The finite set of potential 
acts by the decision maker. A decision maker can 
se�t a s�cific act { d} from the set of possible acts 
Di-{d1, d2, ... , dnlt. 
(ii) Xi: State of the world at time i. A state refers to the 
fmite set of feasible outcomes of the world. Each out­
come has associated with it a joint probability measure. 
(iii) Ui: Utility evaluation in the state Xi. The decision 
maker assigns utility U(d, x) for each decision and each 
feasible outcome. Probability times utility is expected 
utility, EU(X, D). 
(iv) P(X/d;): Probability assessment on Xi. For every 
decision d; the decision maker directly or indirectly 
assigns a joint probability measure P(X/d;) to each 
possible outcome in the state at time i. 
(v) T: Transformation rules. A set of rules that map 
each element of Xi into an element of Xi+l' 
The terms and the information required for T-BIL are 
presented in more detail as follows: 
(1) Decision Problem: A problem that requires the 
logical analysis of choice among courses of action 
from the decision set, D i• when the outcome of any act 
depends on the current state of the world, Xi, which is 
known with uncertainty, and it is possible at a cost to 
obtain additional information about the current state. 
The decision maker's preferences for consequences are 
expressed by his utility evaluation Ui, and the weights 
he attaches to possible outcomes are expressed by his 
probability assessment P(X/di). 
(2) Training Example: A specific example of a correct 
solution to the decision l'roblem. The training example 
should contain information that is sufficient, given ihe 
assumed background conditions, to solve at least one 
stage of a sequential decision problem. 
(3) Domain Theory: A set of rules and facts sufficient 
to prove that the training example is a solution to one 
stage of the decision problem. The domain theory ei­
ther includes the necessary prior J>robabilities and as­
sumptions about the conditiomil independence of 
various hypotheses or can obtain them from another 
information source. 
(4) Observation Reports: Reports to the decision 
maker on the outcome of measurements, experiments, 
que�es, or decisions that. provide additional infor­
mation relevant to the decisiOn problem. Observation 
reports can contain the same data as a training ex­
ample, but a training example is an instance used m the 
generalization process while an observation report is an 
mstance used to revise J>robabilities associated with the 
already-generalized explanation. 
(5) Opera�U?nal Explllnafion: A requ!rement that the 
terms used m the generalized explanation be reducible 
to terms that are observable and measurable in the 
problem contexts. Theoretical explanations have 
meaning only through their connection with the observ­
able. Thus Clecision procedures, the training example 
and observation reports must ultimately be based on 
observable and measurable terms. 
Given this information in (1)- (4) and the constraint in 
{5),. the system will generate a specific explanation to 
Jl;lStify why the training example solves the initial deci­
Sion problem. This explanation is structured as an in­
fluence diagram that is formed by using the inference 
rules !lld tlie conditional independence relations in the 
domal!l theory. The next step is to generalize this ex­
plana�on, usmg goal regressmn. The generalized ex­
pla!Jation �o�sequently c�>Vers a class of ins�ces 
while specialized explanation only covers the traming 
example. The decision maker will make a decision 
observe the outcome, and revise his beliefs, thus 
moving from one state to the next 
3. A Brief Review of Influence Diagrams 
In EBG, the explanation structure is a proof tree 
formed using first-order logic. In order to represent 
causal explanations that involve probabilistic measures 
of uncertainty, the proof tree will be replaced by a 
graph called an iilfluence diagram (Howard and 
Matheson 1981; S hachter 1986; Pearl 1986). Readers 
having a backwound in decision theory are un­
doubtedly famiher with influence diagrams; but those 
whose background is AI may find this brief reveiew of 
influence diagrams useful. 
An .influence diagram is an acyclical directed graph 
havmg two types of nodes: chance nodes and decision 
nodes. A chance node corresponds to a random vari­
able and is drawn as a circle. A decision node is drawn 
as a rectangle. 
Any well-formed influence diagram can be trans­
formed into a decision tree. Decision trees rapidly be­
come unwieldy, so that in complex problems they do 
�ot provi�e as clear, �oncise, or intuitive an explana­
tiOn as mfluence diagrams. Moreover influence 
diagrams provide an explicit represe�tation of 
pro��bilistic dependencies that are only implicit in 
deciSion trees. 
Cond_itioning influences are represented by arrows 
entenng chance nodes. These arrows show the vari­
ables on which the probability distribution of the 
c�ance nod�. variable will be conditioned. They in­
dicate conditional dependence. In the diagram below 
varia!'!e C deJX?nds on B and B depends on A, but C is 
conditionally mdependent of A. This means that 
P(C/B)=P(C/B,A). In other words, any effect that A 
has on C occurs through its effect on B. If there 
wen� ��ther arc d�ctly con�ecting A and C, then the 
possibihty would exist that C IS not conditionally inde­
pendent of A. It is preferable to omit the arc between 
two nodes that are conditionally independent because 
the graph then explicitly represents the independencies. 
An important consequence of Bayes' theorem is that 
arcs that connect chance nodes can be reversed without 
mak�g �y incorrect or additi<?nal assertions about the 
possible mdependence of vanables provided that all 
probabil�ty assignments are based on the same set of 
mformation @oward and Matheson 1981).- Bayes' 
�eorem permits one to calculate P(A/B) or P(B/AJ in­
differently given the same information. 
S.in.� arcs betw�n chance nodes only indicate the pos­
sibility of conditional dependence, it is possible to add 
arcs between any pair of chance nodes without chang­
ing the meaning of the diagram. One cannot, however 
remove an arc unless conditional independence is 
proposed. 
lnfo�ma�ional infllfe.nces are represented by arrows 
leading mto a decision node. They represent a basic 
cause-effect ordering. In the following diagram the 
arrow from the chance node D to the decision node E is 
an informational influence. This means that the 
E 
inf9rmation. resu�ting from knowledge of the random 
vanable D IS availab1e to E at the time of the decision. 
The arrow between D and E cannot be reversed without 
cha!J�ng the state of information at the time of the 
declSlon. The arrow from decision node E to chance 
node F is a conditioning influence on F. It means that 
240 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
what occurs in F is conditionally dependent on the 
results in E. But the information in F is not known 
before the decision at E is taken. 
Influence diagrams are based on the supposition that a 
single person (or machine) is the decision maker. 
Another related assumption is the "no forgetting" rule. 
All information that corresponds to events that occur 
before a decision is made 1s available to the decision 
maker. He cannot "forget" that something happened. 
Influence diagrams must be acyclical. It is sometimes 
the case that a directed cycle will be formed if a deci­
sion leads to successor chance nodes which have ar­
rows leading into a chance node that is a predecessor to 
the decision. In that case it is usually possible using 
Bayes' theorem to reverse an arc between two chance 
nodes, thus eliminating the cycle. 
4. A Robot's Choice-Of-Path Problem 
4.1 Problem Statement 
Dynamic programming is an optimization procedure 
that is applied to problems requiring a sequence of in­
terrelated decisions. When the outcomes of the deci­
sions are stochastic and there is feedback, the theory 
for solving these problems is frequently referred to as 
stochastic adaptive control theory or Bayesian decision 
theory. Very many of the problems associated with the 
techniques and theory in tliis area can be represented as 
a form of the shortest-path problem (Dreyfus and Law, 
1977). The following robot's choice-of-path problem 
is simply a specific instance of the very general 
stochastic shortest-path problem. It has been structured 
to be a further development of the Safe-to-Stack(x,y) 
example used by Mitctiell et al. (1986). 
Suppose that we have available an autonomous mobile 
robot that can do a variety of tasks. We would like the 
robot to follow a path from point A to point B using the 
shortest route, subject to certain constraints. Let us 
further suppose that the route traverses 200 intersec­
tions. At each intersection the robot can observe that 
the shortest path is blocked by a box and a table. The 
robot must decide if it can safely stack the box on the 
table. Its domain knowledge includes facts such as half 
of the boxes have density of .3 and half have density of 
.4, tlle table is believed to be Fragile with 
P(Fragile)=.80 or Sturdy with P(Sturdy)=.20, weight is 
equal to volume times density, a densimeter can 
measure a box's density with a random error, and 
SJ>ecific utilities are attached to each outcome. In terms 
of the T-BIL method presented in previous sections, we 
can describe the robot's problem as follows: 
(1) Decision Problem: Choose the PathDecision in 
each state that will maximize the decision maker's total 
utility of going from an initial point A to a terminal 
point B. ll requires choosing either the Ions- or short 
path at each intersection. The utility assocrnted with 
each outcome is measured in arbitrary units called utils. 
If the short path is taken, tlle box is stacked on the 
table, and ilie table does not break, the outcome is 
worth +100 utils. If the table breaks, the outcome is 
worth -100 utils. If the long path is taken, the certain 
outcome is worth+ 10 utils. 
Max[Utility(PathDacision(1)+ ... 
+PathDecision(200))] 
Utils((ShortPath&Resists +100) 
(ShortPath&Breaks -100) 
(LongPath +10)) 
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(2) Training Example: The ShortPath is chosen. 
Box-0 is stacked on Table-0, and the table Resists. 
Table-0 weighs 4 units. Box-0 has known volume and 
density. 
IsA(Box-0 Box State(O)) 
Density(Box-0 .4 State(O)) 
Volume(Box-0 10 State(O)) 
IsA(Tabla-0 Table State(O)) 
Weight(Table-0 4 State(O)) 
Outcome(Table-0 Resists State(O)) 
PathChosen(Short-Path State(O)) 
(3) Domain Theory: Default values for box densities 
show that half the boxes have density of .3 and half 
have density of .4. The densimeter has a measurement 
error of 0 or plus or minus .1 with equal probability of 
occurrence. It is assumed that the class Table is either 
Fragile or Sturdy. The initial belief is .8 that all tables 
are Fragile and .2 that they are all Sturdy. If a table is 
Fragile, it will always support a box that weighs less 
thaii the table; it will resist without breaking a box that 
weighs the same as the table only 40% of the time. If a 
table is Sturdy, it will resist a box that weighs the same 
as tlle table 60% of the time. All tables to be encoun­
tered weigh 4 units. All boxes have volume of 10 
units. The formula relating weight, volume, and den­
sity is known. Measurement of density can be take 
with a densimeter. 
BoxDensities(P(.3)=.5 P(.4)=.5) 
DensimeterError(P(.1)=.33 
p (0)=.33 
p (-.1)=.33) 
Tabla(P(Fragile)=.S P(Sturdy)=.2) 
Fragila(P(Resists-Lighter-wt)=1 
P(Resists-Equal-wt)=.6) 
Sturdy(P(Resists-Lighter-Wt)=1 
P(Resists-Equal-Wt)=.4) 
Voluma(Box P(10)=1) 
Waight(Tabla P(4)=1) 
Fo�la(Waight=Volume*Dansity) 
Heaaurament(Dansity Densimeter) 
(4) Observation Reports: Information on (1) whether 
the table Breaks or Resists when a box is stacked on it, 
and (2) the PathChosen. 
(5) Operational Explanation: The causal exflanation 
must be reducible to a description in terms o features 
that are observable and measurable in the problem con­
text For this problem, the following key terms are 
observable and measurable: Short-Path, Long-Path, 
Breaks, Resists, Density, Volume. The terms Sturdy 
and Fragile are not directly observable, but are defined 
in terms of frequencies of observable events. The 
Weight of boxes is not directly observable in the 
problem context, but is defined in terms of Density and 
Volume, which are observable. 
Given this information, the system will generate an in­
fluence diagram, which is the explanation structure that 
shows why the trainiJ!g examrle is a solution to the 
decision problem. Figure shows an influence 
diagram that corresponds to the specific explanation for 
the training example. Figure 2 presents the influence 
diagram that corresponds to the generalized explana­
tion that exists in state 1, the situation when the robot 
arrives at the first intersection and must make a deci­
sion. In Figures 1 and 2, I have used a diamond shape 
to indicate the final outcome where utility is assigned. 
It corresponds to a specialized chance node. Figure 3 
presents the decision tree for state 1. 
The influence diagram in Figure 2 shows the explana­
tion with the context determined by the training ex­
ample. The explanation can be used to answer why­
questions involving the two decisions and the observed 
events: 
• Why did you measure density? 
• Why did you take the short path? 
• Why did the table resist? 
The explanation provides the directly relevant antece­
dents to the decisions and observed events. The con­
text provided by the training example determines 
whicli of many possible explanations is chosen and 
where the explanation stops: what is relevant and, 
most importantly, what is irrelevant. 
The decision problem is subject to combinatorial ex­
plosion. In our example, the robot will have to solve 
the path-choice problem 200 times. Thus at each ter­
minal node in the decision tree there should be another 
decision tree. Since there are 15 non-ze�robability 
terminal nodes, this would require 15 terminal 
nodes. The approach used here follows the basic 
method of dynamic programming by breaking the large 
problem up into a multistage problem that can be 
solved one stage at a time. This reduces the number of 
paths to be explored from 15200 to a more manageable 
15*200. 
In the following sections, the relationship between each 
figure and the underlying decision processes will be 
explained in more detail. 
4.2 The Specific Explanation 
Consider the specific explanation of the training ex­
ample as represented in Figure 1. The nodes are num­
bered and will be referred to as N1, N2, and so on. 
Begin the analysis with the decision represented by N8. 
The decision to take the short path has the con­
sequences that the table resisted the box's weight with­
out breaking, thus leading to an outcome valued at 100 
utils. The observation that the table resisted was fur­
nished by the training example, while the utility value 
was inferred from the statement of the decision 
problem, which is supplied along with the training ex­
ample. Starting at N7, the method examines the 
preconditions that must be fulfilled for the table to 
resist. The table can be either sturdy or fmgile, but N5 
is a terminal node so no further regression can be done. 
At N6, the box can weigh less than or the same as the 
table, but there are two nodes that determine the value 
of this node. Go frrst to N4, a terminal node, and fmd 
the weight of the table. At N3 the weight of the box is 
unknown, but it can be determined by the density and 
volume, which are given in the training example, along 
with the formula Ior weight, whicli is part of the 
domain knowledge. Although it would be possible to 
represent explicitly the wetght formula, it has been 
omitted for conciseness. Once the values for nodes 1 
and 2 are found, they are propagated down and the 
diagram corresponds to Figure 1. 
4.3 The Generalized Explanation 
Figure 2 is the influence diagram of the generalized 
explanation that is built from the specific explanation 
in Figure 1. The two major differences between the 
two figures are (1) the generalization from the in­
stances of Box-0 and Table-0 to the classes Box and 
Table, and (2) the addition of three new nodes (NlO, 
N l l ,  N12) reflecting knowledge from the domain 
theory about measuring density. If the generalized ex­
planation structure in Figure 2 is well formed, enough 
mformation exists to transform it algorithmically into a 
decision tree that can be used to solve the decision 
problem. 
For Figure 2, let us consider frrst only the nodes that 
have been generalized, nodes 1 through 9. At Nl ,  it is 
stated that all boxes have densities of either .3 or .4, 
and that these are uniformly distributed among the 
population of boxes. From N2, boxes have a default 
volume of 10, giving at N3 an equal distribution of 
weights being either 3 or 4. Since fiom N4 tables have 
a default weight of 4, N6 has the conditional 
probabilities 
P(BoxWeight=TableWeight/N3, N4) =.50 
P(BoxWeight<TableWeight/N3, N4) =.50 . 
N5 has two unconditional subjective probabilities 
about the belief that a table is Fmgile or Sturdy, and 
two objective probabilities that are used in the defini­
tions of Fragile and Sturdy. The subjective prior 
beliefs about whether the table is Fragile or Sturdy are 
P(Fragile) = .8 
P(Sturdy) = .2. 
Note that we are representing the disjunct that tables 
are either Sturdy or Fragile. The objective probabilities 
associated with the defmitions are 
P(Resists/Fragile, Same Weight)= .40 
P(Breaks/Fragile, SameWeight) = .60 
P(Resists/Sturdy, Same Weight)= .60 
P(Breaks/Sturdy, Same Weight)= .40 
The probabilities from N5, and N6, and the decision in 
N8 lead to nine conditional probabilities in N7. Eight 
of these are conditional on a decision to take the short 
path plus the three other pairs of probabilities from N5 
and N6, while one is conditional on a possible decision 
at N8 to take the long path. 
Before a decision is considered to measure density, the 
nine probabilities that are calculated at N7 correspond 
to the nine terminal nodes of the c5 branch of the oeci­
sion tree in Figure 3. The probabilities are multiplied 
by the appropnate utilities at N9, which are propagated 
up the decision tree to give the expected utiltty of 44 at 
ilie second-level decision c5 in Figure 3. 
A decision must be made about whether or not to 
measure density before the path decision is made. If a 
box has a measured density of .5, the robot will be able 
to infer that the box weighs 4 units. If the measured 
density is .2, it will infer that the box weighs 3 units. 
Other measured densities provide no addiuonal infor­
mation over the basic information provided at Nl .  
The inclusion of the density-measurement decision will 
require more probabilities to be calculated for state 1. 
The robot wil have to consider the probability of each 
density value conditional on the dectsion to measure at 
N10, the error distribution at N l l , and the distribution 
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of densities among boxes at Nl.  These four con­
ditional probabilities are prior information that will be­
come known with certainty at the time of the decision 
to choose a path. This is indicated by the informational 
arrow going from N12 into N8. This in turn requires 
four new sets of conditional probabilities to be cal­
culated at N7, with outcomes at N9, conditional on 
each possible outcome of the measurement act The 
appropriate probabilities can be found by tracing the 
upper brandies of the decision tree from b1 to the ter­
minal nodes. In state 1 there are 39 different paths 
through the decision tree, of which 24 terminate at 
some point with a zero probability of being taken. 
The value of perfect information can be easily cal­
culated from the decision tree. Given perfect infor­
mation about box densities, utility will be maximized if 
(a) the short path is taken whenever a box weighs three 
units and (b) the long path is taken whenever a box 
weighs four units. The values of this strategy cor­
respond to values at nodes c1 and c4, each w1th as­
socmted probabilities of .5. The ex�ted utility of this 
plan is 55 utils. The expected utility of making the 
path decision without density measurement is only 44 
utils (c5). If density measurement is performed, the 
optimal strategy in state 1 will be to take the short path 
in all cases except when measured density is .5. This 
will give an expected utility of 47.7 utils. Thus perfect 
information adds 11 utils over the uninformed choice, 
while density measurement adds 3.7 utils. In our ex­
ample, measurement costs nothing, but if its cost were 
eqUal or greater than 3.7 utils, it should not be done. 
It is also possible to measure the value of perfect infor­
mation about the supportive capacity of tables. First, 
suppose that the robot correctly knows that the tables 
are Sturdy. Then the optimal strategy will be always to 
take the short path. The realized utility will be +20 for 
heavy boxes and +100 for light boxes, yielding an 
average utility for perfect information of 60. Next, 
suppose that the rooot knows correctly that the tables 
are Fragile. In this case, the current strategy in Fig. 3 is 
optimal, the utilities at d3 and d5 will be 40, and the 
realized utility for perfect information will be 45. The 
expected utility from perfect information will be the 
weighted sum of those two utilities, with weights 
depending on the robot's current beliefs in the strength 
of tables: 
48 = .2(60) + .8(45) 
Perfect information about the strength of tables is thus 
worth only 0.33 utils, the difference between what he 
believes perfect information is worth (48.00 utils) and 
the expected value of his current strategy (47.67 utils). 
A summary of what has been accomplished up to this 
point may be useful. First, we have solved one part of 
the explanation problem: A generalized explanation in 
the form of an influence diagram has been constructed 
from a problem statement ana a training example. The 
explanation can be used to answer why-questions in­
volving each decision and the observed consequences 
of the decision: Why was it decided to ... ? , and Why 
was it observed that ... .? The explanation uses con­
cepts that sometimes are not directly observable, such 
as the weight of a box or the expected utilities of an 
action, but the explanation is grounded in observable 
features, such as density, volume, table breaks, 
measured density, etc. Second, we have used the 
generalized explanation to construct a decision tree 
corresponding to state 1. Although a decision tree can 
always be derived from a well-formed influence 
diagT?ffi, it is not strictly necessary in order to solve the 
deciSion problem. It 1s possible to go from the in­
fluence dmgram directly to the solution, with the deci­
sion tree bemg only an implicit intermediate step. The 
decision tree was used to explain the details of the 
solution to the decision problem in state 1. The value 
of _perfect information and of a decision to gather more 
infOrmation was inferred from the available infor­
mation, and a decision was made to measure density 
and to choose a path conditional on this information. It 
remains to constder how the explanation and decisions 
are modified by inductive reaming as the robot 
progresses from one state to another. 
4.4 Inductive Learning Between States 
The passage between states occurs as a result of a stan­
dard series of transformation rules which can be sum­
marized as decide, observe, and update. The previous 
section discussed how to decide. The problem now is 
to observe and update so that inductive learning takes 
place. In order to illustrate how this is done, let us 
suppose that the box to be encountered at intersection 
1, Box-1, has a measured density of .4, that the short 
path is taken and Box-1 is stacked on Table-1, and that 
the table resists the weight of the box. How would 
these observations change the robot's beliefs? 
The inductive learning is manifested by a change in 
beliefs at N5 about whether the table is Fragile or 
Sturdy. The odds-ratio form of Bayes' rule will prove 
to be convenient for discussing inductive learning. 
Form the ratio of the two beliefs using the standard 
form of Bayes' equation to get the odds ratios for the 
case of the table resisting: 
0 
post= L·O prior 
where the posterior odds are 
0 = P(Fragile/Stacked, Resists) 
post P(Sturdy/Stacked, Resists) ' 
the prior odds are 
0 . = P(Fragile) 
priOr P(Sturdy) ' 
and the likelihood ratio is 
L 
= P(Resists/Fragile, Stacked) 
P(Resists/Sturdy, Stacked) · 
To calculate the value of the likelihood ratio when a 
box is stacked and the table resists, let us consider 100 
boxes and assume that they are perfectly divisible. If 
we start with 100 boxes, 50 heavy and 50 light, we 
eliminate the 16.67% of the boxes that are heavy and 
have a measured density of .5: They will not be 
stacked. We now have 83.33 boxes, of which 50 are 
light and 33.33 are heavy. If the 50 light boxes are 
stacked, regardless of whether the table is Fragile or 
Sturdy, it will resist 50 times. If the table is Fragile, it 
will resist 40% of the heavy boxes (13.33 times). Thus 
given that the table is Fragile and that 83.33 boxes are 
stacked, the table will res1st 76% of the boxes (63.33 
times). Similarly, given that the table is Sturdy and 
that 83.33 boxes are stacked, the table will resist 84% 
of the boxes (70 times), which is derived from resisting 
60% of the heavy boxes (20 times) and all the light 
boxes (50 times). The likelihood ratio, given that a box 
has measured density of { .2 .3 .4} , it is stacked on the 
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table, and the table resists, is: 
L(R . ) _ 
P(Resists/Fragile) eszsts -
P(Resists/Sturdy) 
= ·76= .905. 
.84 
The likelihood ratio that the table breaks is: 
L(Breaks) = 
P(Breaks/Fragile) 
P(Breaks/Sturdy) 
= .24 = 1.5. 
. 1 6  
In the transition from state 1 to state 2 ,  it was observed 
that the table resisted. Multiply the prior odds of 4 by 
the apP.roj}riate likelihood ratio to get the posterior 
odds of 3.62. We can recover the probabilities by 
using the formula 
0 
P(Fragile/Observation) = ;;st = .78. 
1+ post 
The belief in state 2 that the table is Fragile has 
dropped from .80 to .78. If the table had been observed 
to break, the posterior odds would have gone to 6 and 
the belief that the table was Fragile would have gone to 
.857. 
The decisions about density measurement and paths 
depend on the beliefs about the table's strength. If the 
table is in truth Sturdy, then at some time in the future 
we would expect that the robot would have inductively 
learned enough to change the decisions being made. 
At the present, the robot decides to measure every box 
and then chooses the short path for all boxes except 
when the density is measured as .5. If the table were 
known to be Sturdy, then the best decision would be 
always to choose the short path. Moreover, there 
. would be no further gain from measurement, so the 
decision would be not to measure. What can be said 
about the point at which the robot's decisions will be 
changed as a result of inductive learning? 
The decision tree shows that when measured density is 
.5, the decision to take the long or short path depends 
on the expected utility of outcomes at the chance node 
el. The expected utility at e1 is -12. The decision will 
be changed to taking the short path if the expected 
utility at d1 is greater than + 10. This can be 
represented as 
P(Fragile) EU(Fragile) 
+ P(Sturdy) EU(Sturdy) >10 
where EU(Fragile)=-20 is the ex�ted utility at node 
f1 of a decision to stack a box, given that the box's 
density is .4 and that the table is Fragile. Similarly, at 
f2 we have EU(Sturdy)=+20. After solving for the two 
probabilities, we fmd that the inequality will be 
satisfied when 
P(Fragile) = .25 
P(Sturdy) = .75. 
The decisions will be changed as soon as it is believed 
with probability .75 that the table is Sturdy. How long 
will that take? 
If the table is Sturdy then for the boxes with measured 
densities of { .2 .3 A} , it has been shown that the table 
will resist 84% of the time while it will break 16% of 
the time. The average effect of applying values for the 
two likelihood ratios, L(Resists) and L(Breaks), in 
those proportions can be found by taking their 
geometric mean using .84 and .16 as weights. If the 
table is Sturdy, the pnor odds will be multiplied by the 
average likelihood ratio 
L(Ave)sturdy = (.905·84)(1.5·16) = .9812 . 
If the table were actually Fragile, the weights would be 
.76 and .24 giving an average likelihood ratio 
L(Ave)Fragile = (.905·76)(1.5·24) = 1.0217 . 
From the average likelihood ratio for a Sturdy table and 
the initial odds of 4, we can calculate that It will take 
131 state transformations on the average before the 
odds go to 1/3, which corresponds to the belief of .75 
that tlie table is sturdy: 
4(.9812f = 1/3 
X =  130.9 
At that stage the robot will always choose the short 
path and will decide not to measure density. 
The updating of probabilities can be done by any of 
several proposed procedures (Kim and Pearl 1983; 
Shacter 1986; Spiegelhalter 1986). In the present ex­
ample, the most straightforward way would be to up­
date directly the probabilities in N5 after observing the 
outcome at N7 and, similarly, to update the 
probabilities at N1 after observing the outcome at N12. 
The remaining probabilities can be directly calculated 
using the relations from the influence diagram to deter­
mine their values in the succeeding states. 
S. Summary and Future Research 
The T-BIL method integrates an essentially deductive 
learning method based on EBG with inductive learning 
methods from Bayesian decision theory. It takes as 
inputs a decision problem, a training example, and 
domain theory and constructs a generalization that ex­
plains why the example is a solution to the decision 
problem. The �eneraliZed explanation is represented as 
an influence diagram and is subject to the constraint 
that it be operational. It is used not only to explain 
events, but also as the basis for making sequential deci­
sions. Once the decisions are made in the initial state, 
a transition to a new state occurs. In the new state the 
outcomes of each decision are observed and the ex­
planation of observed events is revised using Bayesian 
updating. This procedure is iterative, thus :providing 
adaptive stochastic decision making. Learnmg takes 
place in a stochastic environment 
The emphasis in T-Bll... has been on the integration of 
symbolic and quantitative methods. Although there 
has been much discussion of the interdisciplinary na­
ture of work in AI, there has in fact been very little 
exploitation of statistical and decision-analytic methods 
by AI workers. Perhaps surprisingly, there also has not 
been much migration of AI techniques into non-AI 
domains. As a colleague recently remarked, there are 
many conferences being given with the title "AI and 
X", where X is any other field. But when you look 
closely at the work being done and the people attend­
ing, tlie conference is mostly just X. 
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T-Bll... uses tools that have been developed both within 
AI and in other domains. The key contribution from 
AI centers on the use of goal regression and an EBG­
like approach to provide the context and to generate the 
explanation of the relationship between theory and fact. 
Bayesian decision theory, dynamic programing, and 
stochastic adaptive control theory have been the 
sources for the quantitative methods related to decision 
making, belief revision, and influence diagrams. 
T-Bll... has used these tools to provide four advantages 
over EBG: 
• Explanations include probabilistic and 
statistical reasoning. 
• Explanations are related to decisions that 
have utility to decision makers. 
• Explanations and decisions are revised in­
crementally on the basis of observation 
reports. 
• Disjuncts can explicitly be represented in 
the explanation. 
The next steps in my research program will be to im­
plement T-Bll... as a working program and to fmd 
suitable real-world applications. Since T-Bll... is a 
general technique that can deal with sequential deci­
sions in a stochastic environment, it sliould be ap­
plicable to a wide variety of problems. For example, 
much laboratory work of a scientific nature involves 
examining data in order to decide which of several 
competing hypotheses is most strongly supported. 
Statistical packages require the user to interpret the 
statistical results and make the decision. A program 
built using T-Bll... should be able to automate a substan­
tial portion of that decision-making process. 
In the world of finance, a real-time trading program 
should be able to analyze stock-price data and change 
its view of the world based on a continuous inflow of 
new data (Star 1986). Existing expert systems are not 
able to adapt quicklr enough to changes 10 the environ­
ment to be useful 10 the f10ancial arena. They also 
have difficulty dealing with statistical hypotheses. T­
Bll... should help us to solve some of these problems, 
thus moving us closer to the day when a financial 
program can act as an on-line real-time intelligent as­
sistant that will analyze data, accept or reject various 
different statistical hypotheses, and recommend the 
most profitable decisions on the basis of its analysis. 
Another problem area where T-Bll... might prove to be 
useful involves the automatic diagnosis oi computer 
network problems (Maxion 1986; Lin and Siew10rek 
1986). Training examples based on specific types of 
faults could be used to �enerate more generalized ex­
planations of the system s behavior. If data from error 
logs were automatically monitored, as certain patterns 
of error reports appear, the automatic diagnostic system 
could propose the most likely hypotheses and alert the 
operator as to a potential problem. As more data ar­
nve, T-BIL would lead to modifications of the initial 
hypotheses. The particular actions recommended 
would depend in part on the cost associated with at­
tempting the specific repairs given the uncertain 
knowledge about the true state of the world. 
Both symbolic and quantitative comJ?utational tech­
niques have proven themselves to provide very power-
247 
ful problem-solving paradigms. An optimistic view of 
the interdisciplinary work being attempted suggests 
that the result of integrating symbolic and quantitative 
methods will be synergistic. It is certainly an inter­
esting problem to be working on and one that is full of 
potential. 
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